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Explaining the variety of social policy responses to economic 
crisis: How parties and welfare state structures interact 
ABSTRACT 
This paper maps and explains the reactions of four welfare states – Australia, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Sweden – to three global crisis situations – the oil shocks of the 
1970s, the worldwide recession of the early 1990s, and the financial crisis from 2008 
onwards. Two main conclusions follow from the analysis: First, using a comprehensive 
typology of social policy reactions to crises, we show that crisis reactions were surpris-
ingly diverse. There is no uniform policy response, as policies range from retrenchment 
through non-response to welfare state expansion. Second, explaining the variation re-
garding expansion vs. retrenchment we focus on the partisan composition of govern-
ment, and the size of the existing welfare state, which may operate as an important au-
tomatic stabilizer during recessions. While none of these factors alone is sufficient, their 
interaction is able to explain most of the specific social policy responses adopted in the 
four countries studied. 
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Explaining the variety of social policy responses to economic 
crisis: How parties and welfare state structures interact 
INTRODUCTION 
The global financial crisis beginning in 2007/08 led to a reassessment of the state’s role 
in contemporary societies (Datz, 2009). When the international banking system was 
shaken in 2008, and OECD economies came to a halt, voters turned to the state for de-
termined ‘crisis management’. National and international actors reacted, at least until 
recently, by various means, including banking nationalization, support programmes for 
domestic enterprises, and attempts to reform global business regulation. What is the role 
of the welfare state in this story, though? Has social policy been an essential part of the 
strategies of ‘crisis management’ in OECD countries? Or has the system of social pro-
tection itself come under strain? OECD welfare states seem to be caught in a tension 
that is succinctly captured in an editorial to a special issue on the financial crisis: 
The crisis has boosted social security’s status, not least in fashioning its role as 
a social buffer and economic stabilizer. But the crisis has also underlined that 
increased social spending on benefits, especially when this accompanies re-
duced income from contributions and investments, has reduced the latitude for 
maintaining, indeed increasing, levels of social spending required in the future 
(McKinnon, 2010: 2-3). 
How do governments resolve this tension? Economic crisis is generally considered as a 
trigger of social policy change (Keeler, 1993; Starke, 2008; Vis and van Kersbergen, 
2007). However, there is a great diversity in policy responses across different places and 
times. Currently, for example, the British government is implementing far-reaching cut-
backs (Taylor-Gooby and Stoker, 2011), while the Swedish welfare state was applauded 
for its stabilising function and hardly came under scrutiny. Why these differences? 
This paper compares social policy reactions to three economic crises in four small 
open OECD economies. More concretely, we analyze how the oil shocks of 1973 and 
1979, the global recession of the early 1990s, and the crisis that started in 2007/08 af-
fected social policies in Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden. We investiga-
te what explains different crisis responses. The focus on small open OECD economies 
is motivated by their high adaptability to new developments, their likelihood to prompt-
ly react to external shocks, and the fact that they are often pioneers of social policy re-
form (Katzenstein, 1985; Obinger et al., 2010; Schwartz, 1994). The countries selected 
represent variation on a number of potential explanatory variables (see below for the 
main hypotheses), namely the partisan complexion of government, the political system, 
the social expenditure rate, and the institutional arrangements and dominant social poli-
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cy paradigms guiding the development of the welfare state (‘welfare regimes’) (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). 
In theory, the causes for variation in crisis responses could be manifold. For reasons 
of space restriction, we will mainly look at two potential explanations in this paper.1 
First, the reason for the differences could be functional, related to the need to stabilize 
by means of countercyclical fiscal policy, and political, related to the party composition 
of governments. As we will show, none of these factors can fully explain the cross nati-
onal and cross temporal variation in policy changes. Instead, we will argue that the in-
teraction of party politics and existing welfare states can help to explain the direction of 
policy change. 
ECONOMIC CRISES AND WELFARE STATE RESPONSES – A TYPOLOGY 
We understand an economic crisis as a situation of a sudden, and often unexpected, de-
terioration of most, or all, key macroeconomic indicators, including GDP growth, un-
employment levels, inflation rates and public debt.2 An international economic crisis is 
experienced simultaneously by a large number of countries world-wide, caused by an 
external shock. Of course, each shock had different root causes and is not entirely com-
parable. For instance, the macroeconomic situation of the 1970s and early 1980s was 
marked by high price inflation. This was not the case in the 1990s and in the current 
situation. However, while each episode displays some very specific conditions, we be-
lieve that these differences can be addressed in the analysis without fully giving up the 
comparative framework.  
Social policy responses are conceptualised as those social policies that are enacted or 
modified either directly in response to an economic crisis, or indirectly, in response to 
the social and economic consequences of such a crisis. In order to meaningfully compa-
re social policy responses across different temporal and spatial contexts, we developed a 
typology, consisting of two dimensions (summarized in Figure 1). As a first dimension, 
the direction of policy change may vary in terms of the size of the welfare state. This 
dimension should not be equated with the level of social expenditure. Expenditure is but 
one indicator of policy change, and a problematic one, at least for our purposes. For 
example, it could be that social expenditure rates increase in times of economic crisis as 
a consequence of more unemployed people claiming benefits, while policies do not 
change at all. In the short term, expenditure can be a bad indicator of policy decisions. 
                                                 
1  A forthcoming book project on the topic (Starke et al., forthcoming) will include a detailed discussion of com-
plementary explanations, including the historical institutional theory of ‘critical junctures’ and theories of trans-
national policy learning. 
2  GDP data for selected years is displayed in Figures A1-3 in the appendix. 
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Therefore, we analytically distinguish between expansion and retrenchment in terms of 
citizens’ welfare state entitlements rather than aggregate expenditure.  
The second dimension is the degree and quality of policy change, ranging from no 
change to what we call transformative policy change. We understand transformative 
change as a change in the principle guiding a social policy arrangement. For example, a 
change from an insurance-based to a means-tested scheme, or from a universal entitle-
ment, to a means-tested provision. The principle of a social policy is not always chan-
ged explicitly. A change in the scope or level of a scheme can also imply a change in 
principle. For example, when a disability benefit used to be of unlimited duration, but is 
changed to become only of limited duration, this entails a change in principle for the 
group of long-term disabled. 
Figure 1: Typology of social policy responses to crisis 
 
Based on these two dimensions we distinguish five types of policy responses: Incremen-
tal expansion (1), or ‘more of the same’, is an expansion or minor modification of poli-
cy settings. Without altering the policy instruments or the principles guiding these 
schemes, the government may lift benefit levels, relax access criteria and lengthen the 
duration of payments. ‘Less of the same’, or incremental retrenchment (2) is, for exa-
mple, a decrease of benefit levels, the tightening of eligibility criteria or the freezing of 
benefit indexation. A response to economic crisis may also involve transformative ex-
pansion (3), when policy instruments are changed or new programmes are added with 
the aim of expanding citizens’ entitlements to welfare state support. An example of 
transformative expansion would be the introduction of active labour market policies in a 
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country traditionally reliant on passive cash transfers. Finally, transformative retrench-
ment (4) may be used as the window of opportunity opened by a crisis may give go-
vernments the chance to fundamentally restructure costly existing schemes with the aim 
of generating large savings. An example could be the abolition, or the complete over-
haul, of the structure and administration of a benefit scheme, or the replacement of a 
benefit scheme with a cheaper alternative, also marked by different principles. Having 
described these conscious responses or strategies, it is necessary to point to the possibi-
lity of non-reaction (5). This is not to say that social expenditure cannot increase – as 
more people claim benefits – but only that there is no formal policy change. 
EXPLAINING RESPONSES – THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
All the types of social policy responses to economic crisis just described can be ob-
served in the countries studied. For reasons of space, this paper focuses on explaining 
the variation on the first dimension (see Starke, Kaasch und Van Hooren forthcoming 
for a fuller discussion). The research question is thus why some governments choose to 
enact expansionary social policies in response to economic crisis, while others opt for 
retrenchment or do not react at all? Two hypotheses are particularly important in 
explaining the differences in the direction of crisis responses. 
The direction of policy change may be largely a functional result of the size of the 
(welfare) state.3 According to Keynesian macroeconomic theory, fiscal expansion is one 
of the main means to overcome economic downturns. In countries with large welfare 
states, this happens via automatic fiscal stabilizers. On the benefit side, public expendi-
ture rises fast as more people receive unemployment benefits and related payments 
(Darby and Melitz, 2008). Moreover, automatic stabilization is also taking place on the 
revenue side since social insurance contributions (a large share of welfare state funding 
in many OECD countries) are heavily counter-cyclical. The size of the welfare state as a 
share of GDP still varies a great deal across the core OECD, ranging from 16.0% in 
Australia to 28.4% in France (OECD, 2009b, figures for 2007). The smaller the welfare 
state, however, the smaller is the effect of automatic stabilization (Dolls et al., 2010). 
From a Keynesian point of view, this lack of automatic adjustments therefore calls for 
higher discretionary spending, including temporary or permanent benefit increases, ad-
ditional emergency schemes and the like. Hence, the first – perhaps counterintuitive – 
hypothesis that smaller welfare states should be more likely to expand social policy 
while we should find either non-reaction or even retrenchment in large welfare states 
during moments of crisis (see also Castles, 2010). Of course, fiscal expansion – no mat-
                                                 
3  To clarify, this is not a tautological hypothesis. The point is rather to explain a change in the size of the welfare 
state with its existing level of expansion. 
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ter, whether it is automatic or not – can become a problem in itself, especially when 
economic recovery is delayed and fiscal deficits cannot be reduced. 
On the political dimension, partisan theories have been successful in explaining the 
development of the welfare state (Castles, 1982; Hicks, 1999; Huber and Stephens, 
2001). Social Democratic parties – as well as the Christian democratic parties of Conti-
nental Europe (Stephens, 1979; van Kersbergen, 1995) – were found to be important 
drivers of the expansion of welfare states across the OECD during the immediate post-
World War II decades. However, with regards to the period after the first Oil Shock, the 
impact of party politics has become more contested. While some authors still find an 
impact of left-wing political parties on social policy expansion, others maintain that left-
wing parties can no longer be seen as the guarantors of welfare state expansion (Huber 
and Stephens, 2001; Kittel and Obinger, 2003; Korpi and Palme, 2003; Pierson, 1994). 
Nonetheless, the hypothesis that crisis responses are caused by differences in the parti-
san composition of governments, more concretely that social democrats and Christian 
democrats respond by expanding or protecting the welfare state while secular conserva-
tives and liberals are more likely to enact cutbacks – is still highly plausible and will be 
discussed. 
At the same time, crisis responses, including functional and partisan responses, may 
be mediated by political institutions. In many countries parties frequently have to colla-
borate in government, either within formal coalitions or in minority situations. This af-
fects the scope of parties being able to achieve their goals, and it might even encourage 
them to change their initiatives towards those which are more feasible in a coalition 
government (Green-Pedersen, 2002). Moreover, powerful institutional veto players such 
as second chambers and strong constitutional courts may enter the picture and dilute the 
potential partisan impact on policy or make even functionally important adjustments 
harder to enact (Immergut, 1992; Tsebelis, 1995). It may be the case, however, that veto 
players become less important in situations of crisis. Emergencies that call for swift and 
decisive action tend to strengthen the executive and may even motivate partisan players 
to make more concessions under time pressure. During crises the effect of institutional 
structures on policy may therefore be weak or even disappear altogether. 
In addition to the simple additive effects of these variables, we need to consider the 
possibility of causal interactions. This means that we explore the hypothesis that the 
scope for partisan crisis management policies is conditioned by the size of the existing 
welfare state. For small welfare states, this would imply that the political left would 
pursue a broadly Keynesian policy of ad-hoc expansion; while the right is much more 
concerned with the fiscal risks associated with expansion and possible disincentives to 
work of higher benefits, which implies a non-response or even welfare state cutbacks. In 
countries with large welfare states, even social democrats would not opt for further ex-
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pansion as the welfare state is essentially already functioning as an automatic stabiliser 
(Cohen and Follette, 2000). The dominant, and more consensual, crisis response would 
be one of non-response or, sometimes, cutbacks – justified by fiscal imperatives (high 
deficits). 
To disentangle the role of party politics, the welfare state and their interaction effect 
we approach our cases by carefully tracing the political process (Bennett, 2008; George 
and Bennett, 2005). The comparison of historical sequences (Haydu, 1998; 
Rueschemeyer and Stephens, 1997) gives us the opportunity to identify patterns across 
time and space in a total of at least 12 national crisis episodes. In addition to looking at 
cross-case regularities, we analyze processes at the within-case level in order to tap the 
causal mechanisms of crisis policymaking. 
THE OIL SHOCKS OF THE 1970S 
In 1973 and 1979 two oil shocks marked the end of three decades of almost continuous, 
unprecedented economic growth and expanding welfare states in most Western count-
ries. The oil shocks induced stagflation and high unemployment rates, and let budgetary 
deficits grow in all four countries. 
Australia 
The 1970s were a time of turbulence in Australia. The Australian Labor Party (ALP) 
under Gough Whitlam won the 1972 federal elections on a comprehensive reform plat-
form, focusing on ‘cities, schools and hospitals’ and a modern welfare state based on 
universalism, greater redistribution and equality of opportunity. Despite economic 
downturn, political instability and a constitutional crisis, the Whitlam government was 
able to enact a significant share of its plans, including significantly higher pension rates 
(Edwards and Whiteford, 1988: 60) and Medibank, a publicly funded, universal health 
insurance scheme (Scotton, 2000). The impact of the First Oil Crisis hardly deterred the 
Whitlam government in its intention to modernise the Australian welfare state (Porter, 
1978). It believed to have a strong mandate to implement its plan “to its last detail” 
(cited in Bach, 2003: 282). Initially, the government’s macroeconomic response to the 
crisis followed the Keynesian recipes (expenditure growth and tax cuts). And while the 
1975 budget was more restrictive, it did not affect the expansionary course in social 
policy. Against the counterfactual of no first oil crisis, the reaction by the Whitlam go-
vernment must probably be seen as one of ‘non-reaction’, at least in terms of social po-
licy. 
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As a consequence of political and constitutional conflicts in 1975, a conservative 
‘Coalition’4 under Malcolm Fraser won the 1975 election by a comfortable margin. As 
the economic crisis continued, the Fraser government embarked on a more fiscally con-
servative course, extended to social policy; and even supported by a Senate majority 
(rare in Australia). Its rhetoric, and to some extent its policy, was now openly anti-
Keynesian (‘Fight Inflation First’ was the slogan). Some benefit retrenchment for un-
employment benefits was introduced, as was a pension means test for people above the 
age of 70. Most importantly, the new universal Medibank health care scheme was expo-
sed to a ‘death by a thousand cuts’ strategy in the years after 1975 and eventually abo-
lished. A number of expansionary initiatives proposed by prominent policy inquiries 
were shelved. While the Fraser government was not a market-radical government à la 
Thatcher (Hood et al., 1988; Mendes, 2008: 29-30), and despite some minor expansio-
nary initiatives, its overall crisis response was one of welfare state retrenchment. 
The fall-out from the second oil shock was more severe, especially in terms of 
growth and employment. It contributed to another change in government in 1983, back 
to the Australian Labour Party under Bob Hawke. Hawke started a process of microeco-
nomic liberalisation of the economy (Castles et al., 1996), without making use of wel-
fare state retrenchment. The central pillar of the new government’s macroeconomic and 
social policy strategy was the Prices and Incomes Accord (the ‘Accord’) of 19835 – an 
agreement between the trade unions and the ALP (excluding employers) based on an 
exchange of wage moderation against improvements in the ‘social wage’. The govern-
ment further re-introduced a comprehensive health care scheme (‘Medicare’) which 
almost exactly restored the universal scheme set up by the Whitlam government. Some 
of the unemployment benefit cuts were also restored, and the basic pension rate was 
lifted back to 25% of average male earnings. In fact, most benefits increased in real 
terms after 1983 (Edwards and Whiteford, 1988: 68). In this sense, the Australian re-
sponse to the second oil shock was welfare state expansion, even though it was more a 
side-payment for the central goal of wage moderation than a genuine reformist policy 
initiative. 
Belgium 
Highly dependent on exports, Belgium faced hard times in the 1970s. Unemployment 
grew sharply, while public finances had already been an issue before the oil shocks, 
                                                 
4  In Australian political parlance, Coalition traditionally refers to a centre-right coalition government between the 
Liberal Party and the Country Party (renamed National Country Party in 1975 and, finally, National Party in 
1982). 
5  The first in a series of eight corporatist agreements that ran until 1996. 
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with public debt being significantly higher than in other European countries (Cassiers et 
al., 1996: 190). At the same time, the political situation was highly unstable. Belgium 
saw no less than 13 different cabinets in the ten years following 1973. The governing 
parties were never entirely ousted but there was usually a change in one of the partners 
with whom the pivotal Christian democrats cooperated in office – socialist parties, lib-
erals, or both.6 This was accompanied by a rising socio-economic conflicts where em-
ployers, concerned about high inflation rates, called for an end to the traditional wage 
indexation regime. When no compromise on wage moderation was found, centralized 
bargaining broke down and the state tried to intervene directly in wage setting in 1976 
(Hemerijck et al., 2000; Van Ruysseveldt and Visser, 1996), provoking a general strike. 
Further attempts to get trade unions to accept wage restraint failed in the 1970s. Eventu-
ally, wage restraint was imposed by the state in the early 1980s. 
Under the Christian-democrat led governments of the 1970s, the most significant so-
cial policy response to the crisis was the decision to introduce various early retirement 
options (Gieselink et al., 2002). This included a ‘conventional early retirement’ instru-
ment, effectively a top up benefit for older workers made redundant during the process 
of industrial restructuring. The benefit was paid by the last employer or through sectoral 
funds. A special government fund was used in cases of bankruptcy (De Deken, 2002: 
30). The overall package was, thus, expansionary and made this so-called ‘bridge pensi-
on’ highly popular among workers.7 In 1975 a law made it possible to lower the mini-
mum retirement ages (65 for men and 60 for women) in sectoral collective agreements 
to extremely low levels (De Deken, 2002: 30; Gieselink et al., 2002: 584). Several 
further early retirement options were set up in the late 1970s (Gieselink et al., 2002). 
Although the original early retirement benefit was intended to be a temporary crisis res-
ponse, its popularity soon put pressure on the government to regularly renew the sche-
me. These early exit policies emerged as a politically and – at least in the short run – 
economically beneficial solution for a number of different players. For employers, early 
retirement was a relatively cheap way of restructuring the labour force (Ebbinghaus, 
2006). Officially, however, early retirement was introduced as a means to combat mass 
unemployment, especially youth unemployment, which had increased significantly after 
the first oil shock. 
Criticism of the early crisis measures came up in the early 1980s, against the back-
ground of continued rising unemployment and skyrocketing public deficits. A new cent-
                                                 
6  What is more, the 1970s were the period when all three parties split along language lines into a French-speaking 
and a Dutch-speaking party. 
7  Before 1975, the only way to go on retirement before reaching the statutory eligibility age (65 years for men, 60 
years for women) was the financially unattractive option to retire with benefit reductions. 
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re-right coalition enacted austerity measures from 1982 onwards, including tightening 
the early retirement scheme (lowering average benefits, abolishing the exit option for 
female workers from age 55). Moreover, the system of unemployment benefits was re-
designed in an incremental manner, away from the ‘Bismarckian’ earnings-related 
structure towards a minimum income benefit that made it much less favourable for 
high-income earners (Clegg, 2007; Marx, 2007). 
Overall, the initial Belgian response to the oil shocks of the 1970s was an attempt to 
use welfare state expansion as crisis management, by reducing labour supply of older 
workers in the manufacturing sectors (designed as a temporary measure). Yet the take-
up of the different early exit options was enormous. The centre-right government shied 
away from abolishing these popular policies but eligibility criteria were somewhat tigh-
tened in the early 1980s. Apart from that, early exit remained one of the cornerstones of 
Belgian social policy. Other notable crisis reactions were moderate cutbacks for higher-
income unemployed and ‘cohabitants’ as well as numerous increases in social contribu-
tions. 
The Netherlands 
The Netherlands was governed by a centre-left coalition (1973-1977), led by the Labour 
party (PvdA) prime-minister Den Uyl, when the first oil shock hit. Although the Dutch 
export oriented economy was strongly affected by the crisis, revenues from the coun-
try’s large natural gas reserves initially softened the impact on public finances. The im-
mediate reaction of the government was an expansive Keynesian policy (Green-
Pedersen, 2002: 110), including support for companies and the creation of jobs through 
public support for labour intensive sectors such as public infrastructure (Visser and 
Hemerijck, 1997: 159).  
Not directly related to the economic crisis, but as part of the plans and ambitions 
with which the Den Uyl government had taken office in 1973 (Visser and Hemerijck, 
1997: 212), some expansive social policies were enacted, including increases in the 
minimum wage level, the level of social assistance and public pensions (De Vries, 2000: 
73). In 1974, the minimum wage and benefit levels were linked to wage increases in the 
private sector and in 1975 a universal social insurance for disability (AAW) was intro-
duced8. More directly related to the economic downturn were some first experiments 
with a voluntary early retirement scheme (VUT), a private arrangement negotiated be-
tween trade unions and employers’ organisations, with the state only contributing 
through a preferential tax treatment. 
                                                 
8  The AAW introduced a benefit at social assistance level to all people who were unable to work due to a disabil-
ity. For people who had previously been in employment, the WAO provided an additional income. 
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Even though budget deficits increased during the 1970s, while it was realised that 
economic growth might not return to its previous levels and unemployment would con-
tinue to grow, due to natural gas revenues “an expansionary course seemed feasible and 
appropriate” (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997: 212), and there was no agreement about the 
need to cut public expenditure (Toirkens, 1988: 32-4; Van Praag, 1990: 156-7). As Min-
ister Boersma (ARP) later put it, there was a strong adherence to “Keynes’ theory, in 
which I, and many with me, still had an absolute faith” (Boersma, 1998: 92). 
The second oil shock of 1979 hit the Netherlands much harder than the first. It trig-
gered a recession and led to fast growing rates of unemployment. Initially, the centre-
right Van Agt government (consisting of Christian Democrats and Liberals, 1977-1981) 
“responded” by non-reaction. Meanwhile, employers actively used unemployment and 
especially disability benefit schemes (WAO & AAW) to shed unproductive, mostly 
older workers (Becker, 2000: 224; Kuipers, 2006: 140). One policy measure enacted 
was to make the tax exemptions for private early retirement (VUT) permanent. Thus, 
the Dutch crisis response was one of labour force reduction through passive benefit 
schemes, but this can hardly be seen as a deliberate government choice. It were the so-
cial partners that managed unemployment, disability and private early retirement 
schemes. However, the government did choose to introduce tax exemptions for early 
retirement, and it chose not to alter the other schemes. Therefore, the response of the 
centre-right government to the second oil shock was one of welfare state expansion 
through non response and some incremental expansion.  
After a brief intermezzo of an unstable centre-left governing coalition in 1981, in 
1982 a coalition was formed consisting of the Christian Democrats and the Liberal Party 
led by Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers (CDA). By that time the economic situation had 
substantially worsened and had become a main issue in the national elections (Irwin, 
1983: 71). While all parties agreed that cuts in government expenditure were necessary, 
the Christian Democrats and Liberals were most in favour of stopping, in Lubbers’ 
words, welfare ‘nonsense’ (Becker, 2000: 224). Relatively quickly they agreed on a 
programme of retrenchment (Irwin, 1983: 75). Once in power they enacted cuts includ-
ing the freezing of unemployment, disability and pension benefit levels by temporary 
decoupling them from wage increases. The benefits for unemployment and disability 
were later also decreased from 80 to 70% of previous earnings, and limited in duration. 
Social policy retrenchment was justified by reference to economic necessity (Green-
Pedersen, 2002: 99). Organisations such as the Central Planning Bureau and the Scien-
tific Council for Government Policy (WRR) contributed to a general sense of emer-
gency and no alternative (Becker and Hendriks, 2008; De Vries, 2000: 75). Although 
the government enacted cuts in all social policy areas, it did not change the passive na-
ture of the Dutch welfare state. The strong emphasis on social security transfers instead 
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of social services, the reliance on working time reduction, and even the linkage between 
benefits and wages were not changed structurally (Van Kersbergen, 1998: 84). 
Sweden 
The Swedish welfare state is commonly regarded as being at the height of its develop-
ment in the 1970s – looking back at many year of economic growth coming along with 
welfare state expansion driven by a dominant social democratic government. When the 
oil shock began to be felt from about 1977 onwards, however, the crisis management 
was mainly left to a centre-right government (1976-1982). 
The first oil shock affected the country by destabilising the Swedish economy 
through a raw material boom in manufacturing and following highly inflated profits and 
wage-cost explosion in the mid-1970s. This was intensified by the supply shock caused 
by rising oil prices. Initially, the social democratic government treated the situation ra-
ther as a temporary downturn and reacted with typical counter-cyclical measures. Later 
responses, introduced by the Centre-right government in office from 1976, had both a 
restrictive and expansive character but were hardly a coherent and broad crisis response 
(Stephens and Bradshaw, 1995). Clearly classifying as concrete crisis management, in 
the context of rising unemployment among particular groups of the population, legisla-
tion in 1975 introduced partial pensions (as a form of part-time employment). In 1976, 
retirement age was lowered from 67 to 65. Nevertheless, compared to Belgian and 
Dutch policies with regard to early retirement and disability schemes, these policies 
appear rather marginal (De Deken 2002). Also, cash assistance for those ineligible for 
regular unemployment benefits was introduced. 
It was only in the beginning of the 1980s, after the second oil shock, that a stronger 
sense of an economic and fiscal crisis emerged, calling for some kind of a reaction to 
tackle exploding public deficit (Premfors, 1998). Apart from devaluations of the crown 
in 1977, in 1980 the Centre-right government reduced the compensation for part-time 
pensions and introduced one waiting day for sickness benefits. Not a massive cut-back 
but it resulted in significant voter lost and helped the Social Democrats in 1982 to return 
to power. Apart from automatic stabilizers, the Centre-right government introduced 
some ALMPs. Labour market measures included subsidized and soft loans to specific 
branches, the expansion of public works and the public sector and training programmes; 
thus, incremental expansion. Also, new branches became part of the social security sys-
tem, dental insurance was included in the social security plan and the housing allowance 
was increased (Palme and Wennemo, 1998: 15). 
Back in government, the Social Democrats promptly abolished the waiting day for 
sickness pay, and introduced some special labour market and educational programmes 
targeted at young people and supporting self-employment. It was further made possible 
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to re-qualify for unemployment compensation through participation in training pro-
grammes. At the same time, though not a straightforward crisis response, neo-liberal 
ideas got somewhat stronger in Sweden in the 1980s. Examples are the introduction of 
some private health care provision, and a discussion emerging in both right and left 
wing parties about welfare state limitations (Nygård, 2006). 
Accordingly, the initial emphasis in Sweden was rather consensually on classic 
Keynesian economic policies, not cutbacks. Particularly compared to the crisis re-
sponses in other countries (and to the crisis in the 1990s) this can be best classified as a 
non-response, with some rather symbolic, marginal adjustments. 
*** 
The responses to the first oil shock was generally Keynesian, consisting of expansion or 
non-response. When more awareness of the crisis situation emerged after the second oil 
shock, retrenchment became part of crisis management measures as well. Conservative 
governments were more willing to introduce some cutbacks, most clearly in the case of 
Australia. But also the three European countries saw some retrenchment while most of 
it was rather minor or symbolical, and much happened in a spirit of consensus that 
‘something had to be done’. 
THE CRISIS OF THE EARLY 1990S 
A stock market collapse in October 1987, known as the ‘Black Monday’, marked the 
beginning of a global crisis that affected various countries. It struck in a period of finan-
cial liberalisation and innovations fuelling a worldwide credit boom and high levels of 
international economic growth. While the stock market itself quickly recovered, and, 
initially, mainly North American countries were affected, the subsequent savings and 
loans crisis spread especially in English-speaking countries. However, the global reces-
sion of the early 1990s had multiple causes and is probably best described as a cyclical 
downturn aggravated by domestic and regional economic events transmitted through the 
globalized economy. The climax in Western Europe, in the form of a currency crisis, 
was reached in 1992/93 (Jonung et al., 2008: 3). 
Australia 
The recession in Australia began in September 1990, lasting one year. Unemployment 
rose sharply during 1991-92 to over 10%. Politically Australia was going through a 
transition period. Treasurer Paul Keating was actively pushing for change, including 
change in leadership. After a failed first attempt to replace Hawke in June 1991, Keating 
finally gained the position of ALP leader and was elected Prime Minister six months 
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later. Meanwhile, the conservative opposition launched a radical policy blueprint, enti-
tled Fightback!, which included neo-liberal policies. 
In February 1992, the Keating government reacted with what became the govern-
ment’s main crisis response – the One Nation package, “a strategy of spending on sub-
stantial and necessary public investments now while private investment is weak and 
bringing the Federal Budget back into surplus when private investment is strong” 
(Keating, 1992: 5). The government decided to boost public demand after pressure from 
the left wing of the party and from ALP state premiers, and after consultations with 
trade unions and business lobbyists. The package included income tax cuts, increased 
spending on active labour market policy and higher family benefits as well as a signifi-
cant lump-sum family benefit payment for low and middle-income families. The social 
and labour market component of the spending package made up 45.3% of the whole 
package (calculations based on Keating, 1992: Attachment B). This demonstrates that 
the welfare state was not seen as part of the problem during the recession but as an im-
portant part of the solution. Further measures in 1992 confirm this impression. At a 
youth unemployment summit in July, the government promised to allocate additional 
resources on jobs and training. 
In addition, and already in August 1991, the government had announced a major 
change to the Australian pension system. It was to develop into a multi-pillar system 
through the so-called Superannuation Guarantee, effective in July 1992, which extended 
occupational pensions to over 70% of employees and institutionalized an employer con-
tribution rate of 3% (to be raised to 9% by 2002). The pension was built on the founda-
tions of the Accord Mark II of 1986, and was therefore introduced with support of the 
unions (Bateman and Piggott, 1998: 555). The key, as in the 1980s, was wage modera-
tion. In order to get the trade unions on board, funded pensions were the perfect vehicle 
for the government to offer something. Pension contributions to private pension funds 
increase workers’ ‘deferred wage’ without leading to immediate wage inflation. More-
over, compulsory superannuation was regarded as an instrument to tackle Australia’s 
foreign-debt problem by boosting domestic savings (Gruen and Stevens, 2000: 57). 
After a ‘surprise victory’ in the 1993 election, the Keating government addressed the 
issue of labour market policy. While economic growth had returned by 1992, unem-
ployment was still high, especially long-term unemployment. Working Nation, a gov-
ernment White Paper (Keating, 1994) proposed a number of legislative changes includ-
ing the so-called Job Compact, a guarantee of a job offer, placement in a training pro-
gramme, or public employment scheme for everyone unemployed for more than 18 
months, based on the principle that ‘every Australian has a right to a job’ (Keating, 
1994: 30). The government introduced a mix of individual case management, job crea-
tion schemes (called ‘New Work Opportunities’) and wage subsidies (Jobstart). Perhaps 
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surprisingly, given this direction, the government also introduced a small ‘labour shed-
ding’ scheme in 1994. The Mature Age Allowance was a benefit for the long-term un-
employed above the age of 60. It was paid at pension rates and beneficiaries were not 
required to actively look for work. In effect, it provided an early retirement option for 
older Australians (never gained the importance of similar programmes in continental 
Europe, however). 
To sum up, the Australian response to the 1990s crisis consisted in incremental wel-
fare state expansion in the short term – especially through One Nation – and some ex-
pansionary policy innovations in the medium and long term. As in the early 1980s, the 
ALP government’s initiatives were framed by a corporatist agreement. 
Belgium 
Belgium had gradually begun to recover from the second oil shock from 1984 onwards, 
though, for example, net levels of public debt were still at a crushing rate of over 100% 
of GDP. Then, as a result of the international economic crisis, during the first half of the 
1990s, the unemployment rate rose to, and stayed at, around 9%. 1993 was the worst 
year in terms of growth, as the economy contracted by about 1% in real terms. 
The political situation had somewhat stabilized in the early 1990s (compared to the 
1970s/80s), with governments changing much less frequently (Timmermans and Moury, 
2006). A crucial figure was the Christian democrat Jean-Luc Dehaene, Prime Minister 
from 1992 to 1999 who headed two consecutive Christian democrat-Socialist cabinets. 
Apart from the recession and its consequences, the early 1990s were dominated by the 
issue of language politics and federalism with a major constitutional reform in 1993 that 
transformed Belgium into a ‘real’ federal system.  
In terms of crisis responses, the 1990s appear as a decade of failed reforms, at least 
when it comes to big structural changes in economic and social policy. The Dehaene 
government, with great aplomb, announced negotiations for a new ‘Social Pact’ in 1993 
to replace the old Social Pact of 1944 as the foundation of the Belgian welfare state 
(Kuipers, 2006: 91). The proposed Pact included a mix of tax increases, benefit cut-
backs, public employment and employer incentives for job creation. The government’s 
proposals provoked a storm of protests by the trade unions and the Socialist union fede-
ration walked out of the negotiations (Hemerijck et al., 2000: 242). While the original 
Pact failed, most measures were nonetheless introduced as part of what came to be cal-
led the Global Plan. Overall, changes in social policy, including the measures of the 
Global Plan, were incremental. 
Yet, as in the 1970s, parts of the welfare state were still seen as effective means to 
manage the crisis and therefore not retrenched, which led to rising expenditure levels in 
the first half of the 1990s. Total public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP rose 
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from 23.8 in 1990 to 27% in 1995. In part, this was due to the continuation of labour 
shedding. The early exit option remained very popular among employers and older 
workers. Accordingly, the total number of claimants had continued to grow significantly 
during the 1980s. There is little evidence that, when recession returned to Belgium, ear-
ly exit was no longer seen as an effective crisis response. On the contrary, a new natio-
nal collective agreement in 1993 introduced even a new early exit route, the ‘partial’ 
early retirement pension. In terms of beneficiary numbers, this route remained marginal. 
Further general pension reforms were enacted in 1996, including a number of rather 
modest cutbacks (Anderson et al., 2007). Civil servants’ pensions, however, remained 
shielded. An uneven development continued to characterize unemployment insurance 
policy. In terms of benefit levels, some categories of unemployed saw benefit increases 
above price inflation in the early 1990s, others saw cutbacks. Overall, no clearly plan-
ned or comprehensive reform of unemployment benefits was introduced in the 1990s 
(Adnet, 2002).  
It was in the 1990s that Belgium gained its international reputation as a non-
reformer. Indeed, the Belgian welfare state did not change very much during the first 
half of the 1990s, compared to many other countries. Overall, the crisis reaction was 
marked by continuity and non-reaction, but perhaps less due to the conviction that the 
system was working but due to a multiplication of distributional and cultural conflicts 
that could not be entirely solved by the political system. 
The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, the 1990s were not characterised by a genuine economic crisis, as 
GDP growth never actually turned negative. Moreover, unemployment had decreased 
during the 1980s and only increased slightly between 1993 and 1995. However, activity 
rates continued to be low. In particular, the number of people receiving disability bene-
fits continued to increase. In 1990 disability benefits were paid for 790,000 FTEs, or 
11% of the total labour force (Kuipers, 2006: 135-6). Instead of an economic crisis, the 
early 1990s have been characterised by a “crisis of inactivity” (Kuipers 2006). 
In 1989, a new government was formed by Christian Democrats and the Labour Par-
ty. Eager to return to government after eight years of opposition, the Labour Party 
agreed on a coalition agreement that included “stringent measures to further reduce the 
burden of public debt, tax and social security contributions” (Kuipers, 2006: 149). The 
party wanted to present itself as “ready to govern, and in a responsible way” (Ibid.: 
149). However, when the economic situation worsened in 1990, the Christian Democ-
rats maintained that even more stringent measures were necessary. 
In a public lecture in September 1990, Lubbers argued that “the Netherlands is sick” 
(Green-Pedersen, 2002: 110), referring to the high number of people relying on disabili-
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ty benefits. This crisis rhetoric helped to put the issue front and centre (Green-Pedersen, 
2002: 108; Kuipers, 2006: 150). The slowdown of economic growth formed a test for 
the Labour ministers, who wanted to stick to their earlier declaimed intentions to de-
crease the public deficit. Since the number of disability claimants continued to grow, the 
government saw a reform of the disability benefit scheme (WAO) as unavoidable. In 
July 1991, a reform was announced. Among other things, the disability benefit had to be 
limited in duration. Also, the first six weeks of sickness benefits were to be paid by the 
employer. The reform plan led to outrage from both the unions and Labour parliamenta-
rians. In October 1991, 250,000 people demonstrated against the planned reforms 
(Lucardie et al., 1991: 18). 
It would take another year and a half to agree on a final compromise. Only after the 
Christian Democrats threatened to strike a deal with the Liberals instead, Labour MPs 
finally agreed on drastic cuts through tighter eligibility criteria and a shorter duration for 
new claimants. In the meantime, the administration of the disability scheme by the soci-
al partners had also come under scrutiny. A parliamentary commission had concluded 
that there was widespread abuse of the occupational insurance system to get rid of un-
productive workers. The social partners, responsible for administering occupational 
insurances, were politically blamed for this abuse. Fairly smoothly, the administrative 
system was changed in such a way that the social partners were no longer involved. 
Instead, the administration was privatised, and an independent public body commissio-
ned the system (Kuipers, 2006). 
The reform of the WAO and especially the subsequent reform of the administration 
of occupational insurances can be seen as examples of transformative retrenchment. 
Although the economic crisis of the early 1990s reinforced the need for reform, the re-
form should not be seen as an immediate crisis response. Instead, it is a response to con-
tinuously high levels of inactivity. The international climate (OECD, EU) that increas-
ingly criticized high wage costs and high inactivity rates have probably contributed to a 
legitimisation of the reforms, especially because this international discourse was picked 
up by national actors, such as the WRR. 
Sweden 
Perhaps as a consequence of not taking crisis management or prevention more seriously 
after the crises in the 1970s, the crisis in the early 1990s hit Sweden with such a power 
that automatic stabilizers were clearly not sufficient for crisis management. Unemploy-
ment levels rose significantly and remained at record high levels of above 10% from 
1993 onwards. There was consensus that a decisive response to the crisis was needed. 
This time the welfare state was in the focus of crisis management measures, and this 
included extensive retrenchment. 
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Plans to reform parts of the Swedish welfare state, and first steps to cutting unem-
ployment and sickness benefits had already been undertaken in 1991 by the new Centre-
right government, in office from 1991-1994, as well as the criteria for receiving disabil-
ity pensions had been tightened. The more comprehensive and explicit crisis response 
came in September 1992 in the form of two austerity packages, agreed upon by both, 
the Centre-right government and the Social Democrats in opposition at the time. For 
labour market policies this brought about a reduction of income replacement rates for 
unemployment benefits, and a five-days waiting period; but also compulsory unem-
ployment insurance was introduced. With regard to pensions there were benefit cuts, as 
well, as the basis for calculating the benefits was reduced by 2%. For the sickness bene-
fit a one-day waiting period was introduced, and employers had to pay the first two 
weeks of sick pay. Regarding family policy, child allowances were affected, as earn-
ings-related benefits were cut from 90 to 75% (later raised to 80%). 
However, in fact, it was then a Social-democratic government, back to power in 1994 
that “accepted the basic TINA logic as they began cutting back several social welfare 
policies” (Steinmo, 2002:852), that, however, were classified by Palme et al (2002) as 
more evenly distributed than previous (“centre-right”) reforms. The consolidation pro-
gramme, designed for 1995 to 1998, comprised tax increases and cuts in expenditures. 
For pensions, for example, this meant that the adjustment of pensions was linked to the 
size of the budget deficit (Government Bill 1994/95). Regarding unemployment bene-
fits, it was no longer possible to re-qualify for unemployment benefits by just taking 
part in training programmes and relief work. Another round of cut-backs was introduced 
in 1996 with a further reduction of unemployment benefits, and five waiting days for 
receiving benefits. Also, though rather short-termed, the monthly benefit per child was 
lowered, and social assistance benefits were cut. 
Thus, with regard to the 1990s crisis in Sweden, crisis management has taken place 
by way of incremental retrenchment (UI benefits, eligibility criteria, benefit indexation), 
and to a lesser extent incremental expansion (ALMP). This was pursued by both centre-
right and Social-democratic governments, often rather consensual. It is also important to 
take into account that in the 1990s Sweden was in a process of privatising part of the 
social security schemes (e.g. care sector, pensions, education); this was not explicitly 
associated with the crisis, but might be classified as having fitted well with the need to 
reduce public expenditure. 
*** 
Crisis responses in the 1990s were more diverse than in the 1970s/80s. We see Australia 
with incremental and some transformative expansion, Belgium with mostly non-
reaction. In the Netherlands, and Sweden, on the other hand, retrenchment can be ob-
served. Sweden, the big welfare state, found itself in a situation of structural imperatives 
that resulted in consensual retrenchment. 
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THE POST-2008 RECESSION 
The most recent crisis (beginning in 2007/2008) was triggered by the collapse of a par-
ticular segment of the US housing market (‘subrime mortages’), which caused a break-
down of major mortgage and investment banks and near-breakdowns of others who then 
had to be bailed out. Due to the globalisation of finance, banks and other financial insti-
tutions worldwide got into trouble in no time (Hemerijck et al., 2009:13). Lack of credit 
led to falling investment and consumption. The post-2008 recession – unlike the oil 
shocks of the 1970s – was clearly a demand-side shock. 
Australia 
This crisis affected Australia comparatively little. While GDP dropped during only a 
single quarter (Q4 2008) and unemployment peaked at below 6% (about a year later), 
this mild recession was accompanied by continuously high demand for Australian natu-
ral resources, a big drop in the Australian dollar in the second half of 2008, a sound 
banking sector, and a backdrop of good fiscal and economic performance previous to 
the crisis (OECD, 2010: 8). During the crisis, employment was shifted from full-time 
towards part-time. Thus, instead of laying off workers, employers chose to retain them – 
even without backing from a state-sponsored short-time working scheme or strict pro-
tection against dismissal. This must be seen against the backdrop of a significant shor-
tage of skilled workers in the Australian economy, that was already obvious before the 
crisis and was expected to remain an issue after it. 
In response to the worsening conditions, the Labour government under Kevin Rudd 
decided upon several large fiscal stimulus programmes in 2008 and 2009 that contained 
sizeable income tax cuts for low-income families, higher pension payments, subsidies 
for home buyers, and large-scale investment in infrastructure projects. The estimated 
total volume of the stimulus measures adopted amounts to 7% of GDP, making it the 
third largest package in the OECD (OECD, 2010). Social policy measures played an 
important part in the stimulus response, especially at the beginning (Gruen, 2009).  
The first of these stimulus packages (Rudd and Swan, 2008) was worth A$10.4 billi-
on, of which A$4.8 billion alone went into pensions in the form of a lump sum payment 
of A$1,400 for each Age Pensioner (A$2,100 for couples, and A$1,000 for recipients of 
a carer’s allowance), to be paid by December 2008. A larger review of the pension sys-
tem (Harmer Review) was already underway and due to report in 2009. Therefore, the 
government deferred any structural changes of the pension system to a later date. Low-
income families also received a lump sum payment of A$1,000 for each child. To 
further assist young families – as well as the housing sector – assistance to first home 
owners was increased. In the 2009-10 budget, the government announced changes to 
family tax benefits, including less generous indexation rules for higher-income families. 
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A range of policy changes were introduced that were only indirectly linked with the 
crisis, including a higher pension age, higher minimum pension benefits (particularly 
for single pensioners) and changes to Superannuation (occupational second-pillar pensi-
on).9 Even in the field of labour market policy, some of the measures enacted in the af-
termath of the crisis had been planned a long time ago against the backdrop of the skills 
deficit. For example, a ‘Jobs Fund’ (Australian Government, 2009) was set up to subsi-
dize employment and training initiatives at the local level. The government also set asi-
de additional funding for case management for jobseekers and eased income tests for 
some benefits. As part of the stimulus packages, additional funding for laid-off workers 
became available through the so-called Structural Adjustment element of the scheme. A 
similar programme was set up at the level of the states and territories. 
In sum, the Australian response to the 2008 financial crisis was quick and decisive. 
In terms of social policy, the response was clearly one of incremental expansion. Ac-
cording to the OECD, about a quarter of the stimulus spending (1.1 of GDP) was spent 
in the form of transfers to individual households (OECD, 2009a: 64). Because Austra-
lia’s automatic stabilizers are small, the emphasis was strongly on discretionary spen-
ding, and temporary measures. The government made sure that no general welfare state 
expansion (beyond the changes already in the making prior to the crisis) was initiated. 
Belgium 
Belgium’s economic performance during the first crisis years was close to the OECD 
average in terms of GDP, unemployment and fiscal deficits. Again, public debt is the 
main exception to this pattern. However, even before the 2008 financial crisis, the poli-
tical situation in Belgium had been novel, difficult and at times chaotic. The process of 
government formation following the 2007 election was affected by long-standing lingu-
istic conflicts; with the main point of disagreement concerning constitutional reform, 
including the distribution of powers across the different state levels (Sinardet, 2010). 
Flemish parties generally call for a greater degree of devolution – notably in the field of 
social policy – while Walloon parties want to preserve federal competences in these 
areas. These constitutional issues could not be solved and negotiations continued even 
after a government was formed. Early elections took place in June 2010 but, until the 
                                                 
9  Two policy reviews had been set up before the crisis. First-pillar pension reforms were largely based on the 
Harmer Review (Department of Families, 2009), second-pillar changes partly on the Henry Review (Australia’s 
Future Tax System, 2010). 
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time of writing (September 2011), no government could be formed10, again due to 
struggles over constitutional issues.  
The Belgian crisis measures must be seen against the backdrop of the constitutional 
and government crisis unfolding simultaneously but largely independently. These mea-
sures were initiated by the Van Rompoy and Leterme governments – both coalitions 
between the Christian democratic parties, the liberals and the French-speaking socialists 
– as well as by the Leterme caretaker government from 2010 onwards. The crisis reacti-
ons in the area of social policy centred on three main initiatives11: short-time work 
schemes (already introduced prior to the crisis), reduced social contributions and active 
labour market measures. Short-time work or temporary unemployment schemes provide 
unemployment benefits for a period of several months during which the work contract is 
not terminated (Hijzen and Venn, 2011). White collar workers are not included in the 
schemes. Instead, they have increasingly made use of an alternative ‘time credit’ system 
during the downturn, originally invented to improve work-life balance (Vandaele, 2009: 
591). The temporary expansion of the (blue-collar) short-time work scheme was part of 
a national collective agreement between the social partners in late 2008. Compensation 
rates were increased, and the scheme was extended towards atypical workers. Moreover, 
the Flemish regional government introduced an additional bonus for some workers 
(Vandaele, 2009: 591). Due to the rising demand from employers of white-collar wor-
kers for a similar benefit, the government introduced a similar short-time work scheme 
for white-collar workers in 2009. Not surprisingly, given the generous schemes, the 
number of workers on short-term working benefits rose steeply (Hijzen and Venn, 2011: 
18). Other measures included an expansion of the existing Work Bonus system which 
lowers social contributions for low-income earners, further training and job search as-
sistance. Some of the latter measures were implemented at the level of communities and 
regions. 
To sum up, the crisis response in Belgium has been one of moderate expansion of al-
ready existing schemes, particularly short-time work schemes. Some of the additional 
crisis measures were enacted on a temporary basis and renewed several times since. 
                                                 
10  Famously, this made the Belgian government formation the longest in the modern democratic history of the 
world.  
11  It should be noted that the years before the political crisis of 2007 were, in fact, a period of wide-ranging social 
policy reform (by Belgian standards). The Generation Pact of 2005 which changed both the general pension 
scheme and restricted early retirement should be mentioned, along with earlier reforms such as the introduction of 
a central pension fund, the so-called Silverfund (2001), to compensate for an expected pension expenditure hike 
in 2010-2030; a new long-term care insurance in Flanders (2001); the introduction of the Work Bonus, a reduc-
tion of social contributions for low-income workers (2001) and higher unemployment benefits (2005). 
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When looking at the whole welfare state, the dominant tendency has been one of conti-
nuity and non-response. The extremely high level of public debt, however, will make 
some more wide-ranging measures necessary. Whether it will be possible to place the 
burden of fiscal consolidation mainly on the revenue side – as was the case in the past – 
is doubtful. In any case, more wide-ranging measures are conditional on the formation 
of a legitimate government. 
The Netherlands 
When the financial crisis hit, the Netherlands was governed (since 2006) by a coalition 
of Christian Democrats and the Labour Party led by Prime Minister Balkenende. Be-
sides large cash injections in the financial sector, the first immediate crisis responses in 
autumn 2008 included working time reduction and the introduction of mobility centres. 
In March 2009, the government announced a package of crisis response measures, em-
phasising that “national investments will not repair the world economy”, and automatic 
stabilisers would be enough to stimulate the economy. Therefore, only some temporary 
and targeted measures were undertaken. The package consisted of the expansion of part-
time unemployment schemes, some investments in (re-)training and mobility of em-
ployees, and special attention to fighting youth unemployment. A distinction was im-
mediately and explicitly made between short-term and long-term responses: 
We are dealing with short-term developments. This and next year we will settle 
for high budget deficits […]. In the long run we of course have to find a road 
towards a solid budgetary balance.12 
Thus, an agreement was already made about future retrenchments. In an extra coalition 
accord the government parties committed themselves to reducing budget deficits by at 
least 0.5% of GDP per year. A long-term ‘sustainability package’ included the increase 
of the retirement age to 67 and cuts in the health care budget. However, before these 
long-term measures could be implemented, Balkenende’s government fell in early 
201013.  
In the May 2010 elections, the crisis and its consequences for the welfare state were 
an important theme (Holsteyn, 2010), and the socio-economic left-right dimension 
played an important role. However, it was generally believed that retrenchment was 
                                                 
12  http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/kredietcrisis/documenten-en-publicaties/videos/2009/03/26/presentatie-
maatregelen-tegen-economische-crisis.html  
13  The government crisis of February 2010 was the direct consequence of a conflict about sending troops to Af-
ghanistan. This conflict was the last in a sequence of internal disagreements within the governing coalition. Most 
of the internal friction between the Christian Democrats and the Labour Party was seemingly not related to eco-
nomic or social policy, but instead to foreign policy. 
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unavoidable. Only the necessary scope of retrenchment was contested. The Liberals 
won the elections, with a programme based on the most far reaching retrenchment of all 
parties, including almost all areas of the welfare state. The other big winner was Wil-
ders’ Party for Freedom, whose programme mixed an appeal for the preservation of 
existing social benefits (such as retirement at age 65) with strong anti-immigrant senti-
ments. After long negotiations, a minority government was formed, consisting of Liber-
als and Christian Democrats, and supported by Wilder’s Party for Freedom. Central in 
the accord reached by the coalition partners were cut-backs to tackle the crisis, and to 
restore public finances. 
Among the main areas of retrenchment are health care (cost containment combined 
with an increase in insurance contributions) and a reform and retrenchment of disability 
benefits for younger people. In total, the cabinet proposes to save €18 billion, and yet it 
has been called unambitious and socially conservative by many (The Economist, 2010). 
Cuts are introduced gradually, with the retirement age raised by only one year in 2020. 
Only the intended reform of the disability benefits for younger people can be seen as a 
form of transformative retrenchment. 
It seems that Wilders has had a substantial influence on the government’s pro-
gramme. His social conservatism prevented radical retrenchment of the welfare state. 
After some short expansionary emergency measures, both the Christian Democ-
rats/Labour government and the subsequent Liberal/Christian Democrats coalition opted 
for gradual retrenchment. Contrary to the 1980s, the extent to which the welfare state is 
held responsible for (exacerbating) public deficits is limited. ‘Big government’ more 
generally is instead blamed. 
Sweden 
A centre-right coalition was in government when Sweden was hit particularly hard by 
the 2008 financial crisis. GDP growth turned negative and inflation peaked in 2008. 
Unemployment went from just above 6% in 2007 to almost 8% in 2010. However, one 
has to consider that the overall economic and financial situation for Sweden was rather 
stable, and lessons had clearly been learned from the 1990s crisis. The situation made 
some kind of reaction or management of the crisis clearly necessary. However, in con-
trast to the 1990s, the welfare state was not the focus of retrenchment. The measures 
undertaken were expansive, attempting to protect people from the consequences of ris-
ing unemployment. The on-going reform path of the centre-right government, in power 
since 2006, was partly continued (focussing on activation measures) and partly inter-
rupted, or even contradicted, by short-term crisis measures. 
More concretely, in October 2008 the immediate crisis response by the Swedish gov-
ernment focused on the financial market (Antolín and Stewart, 2009; Jochem, 2010). 
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Later, the government detailed its steps in its economic proposition for 2009/2010 and 
stressed public finances, employment and the welfare state as the key targets. Being 
well aware of the difficulty of the Swedish model to cope with high levels of unem-
ployment, as experienced in the 1990s-crisis, the document states that the most impor-
tant target is to bring more people into work in order to avoid permanent high unem-
ployment levels. This should be achieved through letting the system’s automatic stabi-
lisers work (not cut backs), and through the use of short-term expansionary measures 
and adjustment of ALMPs for most vulnerable groups. More concretely, it is said that 
that preventing the cut of publicly financed jobs was one of the most cost-effective 
measures for slowing down the decrease of employment. Therefore it is proposed to 
increase the resources for the regional and local levels (kommuns, landsting), for exam-
ple, in health care, care for the elderly and education. The proposition makes sugges-
tions as to practical and university education and more ALMPs, and an increased focus 
on young unemployed people. Discretionary changes in ALMPs in response to the crisis 
included job subsidies and recruitment incentives, job-search assistance, work experi-
ence programmes and matching, training programmes (ILO, 2009:23). At the same 
time, taxes on income and pensions have been reduced and housing benefits for people 
with health problems have been increased (Regeringens proposition 2009/10:1, 
200924f:24f). In October 2009, legislation for the smoothing of the adjustment of pen-
sions was passed in order to make sure that pensioners would not face a loss of income 
(Bonnet et al., 2010; Jochem, 2010:27). 
In September 2010 the Centre-right government was confirmed in office – also 
speaking for the acceptance of its crisis management by the population. The country 
relied on its automatic stabilizers together with some expansionary measures in the form 
of activation programmes. Now, the country finds itself once again in the focus of inter-
national interest and admiration – it is one of the very few countries not facing the EU’s 
excessive deficit procedure14; and the IMF and the OECD praise: “The Swedish econ-
omy is strong like Pippi Longstocking!” 
*** 
The social policy responses to the most recent global economic crisis do mostly not re-
gard the welfare state as the problem for budget deficits, and retrenchment – in the 
countries studied in this paper – has mostly been of limited importance, with the excep-
tion of the Netherlands so far. Short-term measures were clearly expansionary, and non-
reaction or the use of automatic stabilisers was the dominant approach, with the excep-
tion of Australia where the government referred to incremental expansion (short-term 
measures).  
                                                 
14  http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sgp/deficit/countries/index_en.htm  
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CONCLUSION 
This condensed overview of the experience of four countries during three different crisis 
episodes leads to a number of conclusions. The first important conclusion is that the 
variation in crisis responses both across countries and across periods is rather striking. 
We find expansion and retrenchment in different countries at different times, in diffe-
rent combinations, and with different emphases on different fields of the welfare state. 
The depth of the crisis does not explain a particular crisis response. There simply is no 
uniform crisis response! This finding defies easy generalization about a ‘retreat’ or a 
‘return of the state’ as crisis manager. 
In the first period, we find expansionary initiatives in most countries, although some 
retrenchment can be found under the conservative government in Australia and the 
Netherlands, and to some extent even Belgium. In the 1990s, the focus is on retrench-
ment in Sweden, in particular, and also in the Netherlands. However, we see little chan-
ge in Belgium and even further expansion in Australia. The current crisis led to short-
term expansion in most countries, particularly in Australia, and to a lesser extent in the 
Netherlands and Belgium. Sweden has weathered the storm without any significant po-
licy changes. Here, the stated aim is to use the existing arsenal of generous welfare state 
schemes to buffer the fallout from the crisis.  Only in the Netherlands was initial expan-
sion immediately followed by retrenchment. Overall, across crisis episodes, we do not 
find the drastic turn from generosity and expansion to retrenchment, or the other way 
around, in crisis responses, that has been part of the political debate on the welfare state.  
When comparing the countries instead of periods, we see an uneven pattern but Aust-
ralia stands out as the country that most consistently reacted to crisis by expanding wel-
fare state schemes. The three European countries tended to be less enthusiastic when it 
comes to further expansion and either did not change existing schemes or even cut back 
in the face of high deficits. This supports the functional hypothesis according to which 
the size of existing automatic stabilizers determines the crisis response. One significant 
exception to this pattern is the expansion of early exit schemes in Belgium and the 
Netherlands in the 1970s. This policy innovation can perhaps be attributed to the parti-
cular structure of the corporatist system that made it easier for employers and employ-
ees to externalize part of the cost of industrial restructuring. 
There is also a partisan pattern in the crisis responses. It is particularly clear in the 
case of Australia, where Labour governments have been consistently in favour of using 
welfare state schemes and even expanding them after crises while the Liberal Party and 
the National Party have either strongly opposed these measures while in opposition or, 
as in the case of the Fraser government in the 1970s and early 1980s, even enacted cut-
backs. This pattern is much less clear-cut in the other three countries. We see some tur-
ning points, for example, in Belgium and the Netherlands in the early 1980s, but no ge-
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neral partisan divergence. Part of this certainly has to do with the institutional set up and 
the multi-party cabinets and/or minority governments that did not allow for radical 
changes.15 But the pattern also conforms to the interaction hypothesis formulated at the 
beginning of this paper. Partisan differences should be more pronounced in smaller wel-
fare states as crisis responses are much less ‘automatic’ and need to be made explicit. 
This makes decisions about welfare state changes during economic downturns subject to 
much more ideologically laden fights about the appropriate role of the state. Retrench-
ments enter the agenda in larger welfare states usually once the fiscal pressure becomes 
too high to be ignored. However, the solutions – usually moderate retrenchments – are 
much less of a partisan issue. 
These findings should be regarded as first suggestions in need of further in-depth 
analysis. What we have learned is, in short: the welfare state is used as a mechanism of 
responding to major economic crises. If it is a reasonably big welfare state, it is – ex-
plicitly or implicitly – used as an automatic stabiliser; and by that way automatic expan-
sion is accepted as a way of tackling the crisis. However, large welfare states can also 
become a burden to public finances, especially when economic recovery is delayed. 
While short-term measures are often rather expansionary, long-term reactions may well 
look differently and include retrenchment. 
 
                                                 
15  Note, however, that the typical Australian government – including all governments included in this analysis 
except the Fraser government – lacks a majority in the powerful Australian Senate.  
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APPENDIX 
Figure A1-3: Real GDP Growth rates, selected countries, in % 
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Note: ‘OECD’ refers to average figure for 21 core OECD countries. 2010 data are estimates. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database, Economic Outlook No. 88 (OECD, 2011). 
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